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ABSTRACT
According to cognitive dissonance theory engaging in 
behavior inconsistent with one's beliefs arouses dissonance. 
When individuals choose to engage in a boring and repeti­
tious task they tend to positively reevaluate the task. 
Recent research (Pallak, et al. 1967) using an incidental 
verbal learning paradigm indicates that subjects who 
voluntarily commit themselves to performing a boring task 
reduce dissonance via enhanced task performance rather than 
through positive task reevaluation. Both the arousal of 
dissonance and its reduction can be expected to vary with 
individual differences. The present study investigated 
the individual differences of sex and internal-external 
locus of control as related to cognitive dissonance.
Casual observation of subjects in experiments have in­
dicated that those individuals who tend to perceive events 
and reinforcements as being determined by factors under 
their control (Internals) evidence greater interest in their 
surroundings and in tasks in which they involve themselves 
than do those individuals who tend to perceive events and 
reinforcements as being determined by choice or factors 
extrinsic to themselves (Externals). This study was a 
2 X 2 X 2  design with personality (I-E), sex, and choice-
• • tvm
no choice as the independent variables. The dependent vari­
ables were the number of incidentally recalled words in a 
situation where the subjects were instructed to copy words 
but received no instructions to retain the words, and 
attitudes towards the task.
The data obtained did not support the hypotheses re­
garding task reevaluation or incidental learning. That is, 
there were no statistically significant differences in 
attitude toward the task or in incidental learning as a 
function of sex, I-E, or choice. There was evidence indi­
cating that the task used in this study may not have ful­
filled the forced-compliance paradigm's theoretical require­
ment of unequivocal aversiveness. It is not so surprising, 
therefore, that measures which are considered to be sensi­
tive to differential dissonance reflected no such differ­
ences. Recall of words in an incidental learning paradigm 





Although several theories dealing with cognitive con­
sistency were introduced into psychological theorizing with­
in a short period of time (e.g., Heider's (1944) balance 
theory, Osgood and Tannenbaum's (1955) congruity theory), it 
was Festinger's book, "A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance" 
(1957) , that caught the attention and imagination of a large 
number of researchers. Festinger's cognitive dissonance 
theory appears to be the most productive social psychology 
theory to date. As an indication of its productivity, Mar- 
gulis and Songer (1969) were able to present a bibliography 
including "319 separate, published, theoretical, critical 
and/or research publications on cognitive dissonance theory 
(p. 923)" which appeared in print during the years 1957-1967. 
A casual perusal of the journals since 1967 indicates that 
articles ate appearing at least as frequently as they ap­
peared during that first decade.
It is with the theory of cognitive dissonance as it 
relates to the internal-external locus of control personality
1
2construct and incidental learning that the present investiga 
tion is concerned.- This chapter will present a brief over­
view of dissonance research and a more complete discussion 
of the internal-external personality dimension and inci­
dental learning.
THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE
As Festinger (1957) stated, the core of dissonance 
theory is extremely simple. It holds that: (1) Dissonant 
or "nonfitting" relations may exist among cognitive elements 
(2) The existence of dissonance gives rise to pressures to 
reduce the dissonance and to avoid further increases in dis­
sonance. (3) Manifestations of these pressures include 
behavior changes, changes in cognition, and circumspect ex­
posure to new information and new opinions. In other words, 
if an individual holds two cognitions--opinions, beliefs, 
attitudes, ideas-- that are inconsistent, he will experience 
psychological discomfort. Two cognitions are considered to 
be inconsistent, therefore dissonant, if the opposite of 
one of them follows from the other (Aronson, 1968) . The 
discomfort the individual experiences will motivate him to 
try to reduce the dissonance; that is, he will attempt to 
establish "fitting" relations among the cognitive elements.
3Research in dissonance theory has been classified into 
three major categories (Festinger, 1957; Brehm and Cohen, 
1962): free-choice studies, exposure-to-informat ion studies,
and forced-compliance studies. In the free-choice situation 
individuals choose between alternatives which usually are 
seen as differing minimally in attractiveness. Dissonance 
is said to be aroused by and is a function of the attractive 
elements of the rejected alternative. That is, an individual 
experiences dissonance between the cognitions "the rejected 
alternative is attractive" and "I didn't choose it." Disso­
nance also arises from the cognitions "the chosen alternative 
has negative aspects" and "I chose it." To reduce dissonance 
in this situation, individuals generally emphasize the posi­
tive aspects and deemphasize the negative aspects of the 
chosen alternative while emphasizing the negative and de- 
emphasizing the positive aspects of the unchosen alternative 
(Aronson, 1968) .
Exposure-to-information studies entail subjects being 
exposed to information which is discrepant with their prior 
attitudes, beliefs or information. In this type of study 
four basic propositions have been tested: They are:
(1) People seek supportive information. (2) People avoid 
nonsupportive information. (3) With increased dissonance
4both tendencies occur more frequently. (4) Both tendencies 
occur more frequently when the individual has little confi­
dence in his initial opinion. Exposure-to-information re­
search has been reviewed by several authors (e.g., Freedman 
and Sears, 1965; Katz, 1968; Mills, 1968; Sears, 1968). 
Freedman and Sears, for example, conclude that the available 
evidence does not support the contention that people general­
ly seek out supportive information and avoid nonsupportive 
information.
In the forced-compliance situation an individual chooses 
between engaging or not engaging in some act or behavior 
which is discrepant with his prior attitudes or beliefs. 
Several research studies, for example, have dealt with the 
concept of inadequate justification for engaging in the dis­
crepant behavior. In this type of study the subjects have 
been given the choice of performing or not performing a dull 
and repetitious task with little justification (e.g., Freed­
man, 1963). This type of study has usually found that those 
who choose to perform the dull and repetitious task subse­
quently evaluate the task in a more favorable fashion than 
those who were given no choice and forced to engage in the 
activity. Deciding to engage in such an activity, of course, 
requires that an individual commit himself in some manner.
5Brehm and Cohen (1962) cite several studies which emphasized 
the role of perceived degree of choice in committing oneself 
to performing the discrepant behavior. They concluded that 
dissonance is dependent upon the degree of choice individuals 
perceive in making their commitment. Brock (1968) also con­
cluded that volition is more effective than other determi­
nants of dissonance arousal.
Another example of this general type of research design 
is the experiment which involves the subjects either prepar­
ing or presenting a communication which is discrepant with 
their beliefs. Probably the best known study in this area 
is that of Festinger and Carlsmith (1959) in which subjects 
were "hired11 for either $20.00 or $1.00 to tell the next sub­
ject (actually a stooge) that the dull and repetitious task 
they had just performed was enjoyable and interesting. The 
subjects who were paid less expressed a significantly more 
favorable attitude toward the dull and boring task than 
those who were paid more. Using rewards of smaller denomina­
tion, Cohen (1962) obtained similar results in an experiment 
in which subjects wrote an essay discrepant from their point 
of view. Also, Lependorf (1964) found more attitude change 
following a bribe of five cents than following one of fifty
:ents.
6CRITICISMS OF THE THEORY
Cognitive dissonance theory and research based on der­
ivations from it have been subjected to a great deal of 
criticism. Some of these questions stem from the generality 
of the statements of various aspects of the theory, while 
other criticisms have been leveled at general methodology 
and interpretation of the data. Several statements in Fes- 
tinger's book (1957) have been viewed suspiciously. For 
example, in one place he says '‘where no dissonance exists 
there should be a relative absence of motivation to seek sup­
portive or new information at all (p. 30)." This is in di­
rect opposition to the body of research evidence accumulated 
by such workers as Berlyne (1960, 1965) regarding curiosity 
motivation.
Brehm and Cohen (1962) anticipated a possible criticism 
of dissonance theory to the effect that dissonance theory is 
actually no different from conflict theory as developed by 
Miller (1944). In their analysis of the two theories they 
pointed out that conflict theory appears to deal with pre­
decision phenomena, while dissonance theory is relevant to 
post-decision phenomena. Two studies dealing with this 
issue (Davidson and Kiesler, 1964; Jecker, 1964) conclude 
that reevaluation of alternatives takes place post-
dec isionally. Cognitive dissonance theory, then, deals with 
attempts to reduce dissonance or discomfort following 
decisions.
Probably the best known critique of the theory of cog­
nitive dissonance is that of the Chapinises (Chapanis and 
Chapanis, 1964). They raised two general criticisms of the 
theory. First, they noted that cognitive dissonance is an 
intervening variable concept which is dependent upon the 
internal cognitions of a person. In some cases they ques­
tioned whether the experimenters had actually aroused dis­
sonance and in other cases they felt that other nondissonant 
cognitions might better explain the results. The second 
general criticism that the Chapanises leveled at the then 
available research was primarily methodological in nature. 
They cited studies containing sampling bias errors and 
studies in which the researcher conducted multiple jt tests 
on the same data, thus affecting the per comparison error 
rate.
In their analysis of the Aronson and Mills (1959) study, 
the Chapanises used the argument that data cited by disso­
nance researchers can be interpreted by relying on interven­
ing variables other than cognitive dissonance. In this 
study, volunteer female subjects underwent an initiation test,
8reading descriptively erotic passages in the presence of a 
male experimenter, in order to participate in a group dis­
cussion on the psychology of sex. The discussion itself was 
designed to be rather dull and uninteresting. Aronson and 
Mills found that those subjects who underwent the more 
severe initiation subsequently evaluated the group discussion 
more favorably than did the mild initiation subjects.
Chapanis and Chapanis felt that the findings were determined 
by a feeling of successful accomplishment on the part of the 
severe initiation group, and argued that "there is no need to 
postulate a drive due to dissonance if a pleasure principle 
can account for the results quite successfully (p. 5)." 
Aronson (1968) cites research conducted by Gerard and Math- 
ewson (1966) as a refutation of the Chapanises1 argument. 
Gerard and Mathewson conducted a study similar to that of 
Aronson and Mills, except they used severe and mild shock as 
initiation before the subjects were exposed to a taped group 
discussion. Their findings definitely supported dissonance 
theory. Aronson concluded that the two experiments taken 
together "eliminate most possible alternative explanations 
(p. 13)."
In a recent paper, Bern (1967) took the position that 
"the appeal to hypothetical internal states of the organism
9for causal explanations of behavior is often heuristically 
undesirable (p. 198)." He suggested that data obtained in 
cognitive dissonance research is explicable in terms of 
self-descriptive attitude statements based upon the individ­
ual’s observations of his own behavior and the conditions 
under which it occurs. Bern presented several replications 
of dissonance research utilizing this concept of self­
perception, which appear to support his contention.
The Chapanises’ second criticism of cognitive dissonance 
research, the presence of methodological inadequacies, also 
bears consideration. They pointed out that when subjects 
are rejected without explanation from the analyses of the 
data, conclusions are subject to skepticism. In addition, 
in the forced-compliance design subjects frequently refuse 
to participate. These two factors may bias the results.
An adequate number of control groups and some measure on 
subjects refusing to participate would obviate this criti­
cism. Another frequent methodological inadequacy, multiple 
t  tests, can be obviated by utilization of techniques dis­
cussed by Winer (1962) and others for conducting a 
posteriori tests.
In his review of exposure to information studies, 
McGuire (1968) noted that although the evidence for the
10
critical selective avoidance prediction is quite poor, none 
of the researchers has completely rejected the postulate. 
While many researchers attribute their nonsupporting data 
to the presence of confounding variables, McGuire caustically 
concluded that this only shows that "with determination and 
a little ingenuity one can survive experimental disconfirma- 
tions with one's hypothesis still intact (p. 799)." He does 
not feel that all this research was futile, however, since 
"at worst, it may have served to demonstrate that the selec­
tive exposure postulate is invalid (p. 800)." He suggested 
that future research should be directed toward the broader 
question of the tactics of perceptual selectivity rather 
than the question of defensive avoidance.
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES AND COGNITIVE DISSONANCE
Festinger (1957) surmised that individuals likely differ 
in their reactions to situations producing dissonance. A 
number of studies have been directed at elucidating the rela­
tionships between individual differences and cognitive dis­
sonance. In a study dealing with alternative responses to 
dissonance, Steiner and Rogers (1963) obtained correlations 
between Minnesota Multiphase Personality Inventory (MMPI) 
scales and responses to dissonance. Subjects could resolve
11
dissonance by conforming to contrary judgments, rejecting 
the source of the contrary judgments, underrecalling the 
disagreements, or devaluating the importance of the topics 
of disagreement. Their approach was a somewhat loosely 
structured attempt at isolating individual differences in 
the resolution of dissonance. Of the ninety correlations 
obtained between MMPI scales and responses to dissonance, 
only three reached a probability level of .05. These results 
would be anticipated on a chance basis alone l Steiner and 
Rogers also reported that Manifest Anxiety Scale (MAS) scores 
correlated positively with conformity and tolerance of dis­
sonance and negatively with rejection for female subjects.
For males MAS scores were negatively correlated with under­
recall. In their dissonance producing situation where indi­
viduals could conform, reject, devaluate, or forget in order 
to reduce dissonance, anxious males avoided the use of under­
recall while anxious females avoided rejection. Anxious 
males didn't emphasize any single response method, while 
females tended to conform or to tolerate dissonance. Steiner 
(1960) , in an ea.'lier study, also observed marked sex dif­
ferences in preference for responses which might reduce dis­
sonance .
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Crowne and Marlow (1964) reported a study which used the 
same task, spool packing for a twenty-five minute period, as 
that used in the Festinger and Carlsmith study. Following 
this monotonous task, the subjects were given an opportunity 
to evaluate the task. Crowne and Marlow found, as they had 
predicted, that individuals with high reed for approval ex­
pressed a more favorable attitude toward the task than did 
subjects with a lower need for approval. Although Crowne 
and Marlowe did not have choice and no-choice conditions in 
their study, therefore not a strict dissonance situation, the 
relationship of their study to the exploration of the rela­
tionship between individual differences and cognitive dis­
sonance can readily be seen. It would be worthwhile to rep­
licate their study using choice and no-choice conditions.
In his paper on individual differences and resolution of 
cognitive dissonance, Glass (1968) developed a theoretical 
approach in which he predicted that repressors and sensitiz­
ers, as measured by Byrne's (1961) R' ^ ression-Sensitization 
(R-S) scale, would differ in their response to inconsistency. 
He subsequently reported a study (Glass,Canavan, and Schiavo, 
1968) which ind icated that sensitizers were better able to 
tolerate feelings of tension and anxiety, and were more like­
ly to hold incongruent percepts than were repressors. Hamil­
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ton (1969) recently reported a study in which he explored the 
relationship between scores on the R-S scale and resolution 
of dissonance. In his study, the response measure of under­
recall seemed to be most relevant to the R-S dimensions, in 
that people may differ in the extent to which they attempt 
t:o avoid or repress inconsistencies. Although the mean dif­
ferences in his study were in the predicted direction, with 
repressors obtaining higher underrecall scores than sensitiz­
ers, they were noc statistically significant.
Using the embarrassment test devised by Aronson and 
Mills (1959) , Fillenbaum (1964) obtained a significant cor­
relation between dogmatism and amount of dissonance reduc­
tion. There was also a tendency for the dogmatic subjects 
to rate themselves as being more embarrassed. However, the 
correlation obtained for the control group was higher than 
for the experimental group, so Fillenbaum was forced to state 
that the question of dogmatic subjects being less able to 
tolerate inconsistency was still open. Crano and Sigal 
(1968) found that highly dogmatic subjects resolved conflict­
ing information in an internally consistent manner when they 
were exposed to an attitudinally discrepant communication. 
Undogmatic subjects were much more inconsistent in resolving 
dissonance. Hunt and Miller (1968) instructed their subjects
14
to advocate a belief-discrepant position. They concluded 
that closed-minded subjects demonstrated greater attitude 
change in the direction of the advocated belief than did 
open-minded subjects.
Bishop (1967) explored the hypothesis that anal charac­
ters, anal-retentive as measured by Grygier's (1956) Dynamic 
Personality Inventory, would not conform to predictions based 
on dissonance theory but would instead make judgments based 
on internalized standards. He used the Festinger-Carlsmith 
task in which individuals are paid to tell another subject 
that the dull and boring task they have just completed is 
interesting and enjoyable. In addition, Bishop's subjects 
participated in a rigged lottery which initially led them to 
expect payment of $20 for telling the next subject that the 
boring task was interesting. Later, they were forced to re­
linquish either $1 (low privation) or $19 (high privation). 
Bishop's prediction that attitudes expressed by high anal 
subjects would contradict a dissonance theory prediction were 
confirmed. High anal subjects under conditions of dissonance 
and high privation responded to the boring task by expressing 
a more disgruntled attitude than did low anal subjects.
Christie (1962) developed a scale, the Mach Scale, con­
taining statements relevant to a Machiavellian philosophy.
15
High Mach scorers agree with the statements and are regarded 
as not being concerned with conventional morality. Epstein 
(1967) reasoned that the task of advocating a position con­
trary to one's own belief would be less dissonant for high 
Mach subjects than for low Mach subjects. This prediction 
was confirmed in a role-playing situation. However, when 
subjects were exposed to a persuasive communication, high 
Mach subjects showed greater opinion change than did low Mach 
subjects. In another study using the Mach scale (Bogart, 
1968), high Mach subjects frequently avoided dissonance by 
refusing to cheat with a low prestige partner. Low Mach 
subjects showed no such difference in avoiding dissonance 
producing conditions. In interpreting the results obtained 
from all those subjects who did choose to enter the dis­
sonance producing situation (cheating), Bogart concluded 
that high Mach subjects don't feel dissonance as readily, 
are better able to tolerate dissonance, or reduce dissonance 
differently than do low Mach subjects. Until research tech­
niques are designed so that these alternatives can be dis­
criminated, similar suggestions could be made for any re­
search indicating individual differences are influential in 
a dissonance producing situation.
16
INTERNAL-EXTERNAL LOCUS OF CONTROL
James (1957, 1965) suggested that learning tasks can be 
ordered according to the degree that reinforcements are con­
trolled by the subject or by external factors. He also sug­
gested that people are describable in terms of their gener­
alized perception of reinforcement as being either a func­
tion of luck or chance, or dependent upon factors intrinsic 
to oneself. The James Internal-External (I-E) scale is a 
measure of the extent to which a person perceives himself as 
controlling his reinforcements. The scale consists of thirty 
scored items plus filler items. The test is scored in the 
external direction and scores may range from zero to ninety. 
A high score indicates that a person is externally oriented 
and perceives events and their reinforcements as being de­
termined by fate or chance. Those with low scores tend to 
consider events and their reinforcements as being under their 
own control. The scale does not appear to be affected by re­
sponse sets since correlations between filler and relevant 
items are nonsignificant. In addition, correlations with the 
Crowne-Marlowe Social Desirability Scale are minimal. James 
(1957) found split-half reliabilities between .84 and 9 6, and 
retest reliabilities between .71 and.86. The mean for intro-
17
ductcry psychology students is approximately 40 -with a stand­
ard deviation of approximately 10. There is no significant 
sex difference on the scale.
The I-E personality dimension has been useful in differ­
entiating various groups. For example, several studies 
(Lefcourt and Ladwig, 1965a and b; Battle and Rotter, 1963; 
Graves, 1961) have shown that Negroes are more externally 
oriented than whites. Other research (Gore and Rotter, 1963; 
Strickland, 1965; Carlson, James and Carriere, 1965) has in­
dicated that social activists are more internally oriented 
than non-activists.
In a study by Julian, Lichtman, and Ryckman (1968) , sub­
jects were placed in a situation where they had little con­
trol over their performance; they were blindfolded prior to 
a dart-throwing contest. Externally-oriented subjects ex­
pressed a greater degree of embarrassment, irritation, and 
distraction than did internally-oriented subjects. Although 
this was opposite to the researcher's predictions, the re­
sults can be interpreted as showing that Externals are more 
easily frustrated under chance conditions, while Internals 
are more easily frustrated under skill conditions. This in­
terpretation receives support from an earlier study conducted 
by Rotter and Mulry (1965) , who measured decision times for
18
Internals and Externals in both a skill-defined task and a 
chance-defined task. They interpreted the interaction effect 
they obtained as indicating that Internals were more highly 
motivated in the skill task while Externals were more highly 
motivated in the chance task. Although neither of the above 
studies allowed subjects a choice to participate or not, it 
would be interesting to attempt replications with both choice 
and no-choice conditions. Casual observations of Internals 
and Externals in experimental situations indicates that, 
generally, Internals are more interested in the task they 
are involved in than are Externals. It would seem, then, 
that under choice conditions, externally-oriented subjects 
would engage in positive reevaluation of a boring task, 
while internally-oriented subjects would likely show no al­
teration in their evaluations, since they generally find in­
teresting aspects in whatever situation they find themselves.
Festinger (1957) vised the example of an individual who 
believes that cigarette smoking causes cancer but continues 
to smoke as an illustration of a dissonance producing situ­
ation. In order to reduce this dissonance the individual can 
either quit smoking or else work on the other cognition;i. e., 
that cigarette smoking causes cancer. Relevant to this dis­
cussion is research conducted by Straits and Sechrest (1963)
19
and James, Woodruff, and Werner (1965) relating the I-E per­
sonality dimension to smoking behavior. Straits and Sechrest 
found that nonsmokers were significantly more internally- 
oriented than were smokers. James, et al. (1965) obtained 
the same results and, in addition, found that those male 
smokers who found the Surgeon General’s report on smoking 
credible and subsequently stopped smoking had significantly 
lower external control scores than those who were not con­
vinced by the report and did not stop smoking. This would 
seem to indicate that individuals who are internally-oriented 
tend to reduce the dissonance aroused by the discrepancy 
between the fact that they smoke and the knowledge that smok­
ing causes cancer by taking direct action on their overt be­
havior. In like manner it could be argued that externally 
oriented individuals tend to reduce dissonance by altering 
their covert cognitions.
Of relevance to the present study is research evidence 
which indicates that Internals are more likely to be better 
informed and more aware of their surroundings than are 
Externals. The Gore and Rotter (1963) results could be 
interpreted as support for this conclusion. Carlson, et al., 
(1965) also found that internally oriented subjects possessed 
more information about Viet Nam and the United States 1 in­
20
volvement there than did externally oriented subjects. See- 
man and Evans (1962) found that tubercular patients whose 
scores were in the internal range were better informed about 
tuberculosis in general and knew more specifics about their 
own condition than did those patients scoring in the exter­
nal direction. Additional support for the conclusion comes 
from studies employing an incidental learning paradigm 
(Seeman, 1963; Spjut and James, 1969).
INCIDENTAL LEARNING
Incidental learning (INC) can be operationally defined 
as learning which occurs when subjects receive no instruc­
tions to learn the material for which retention will be 
tested, while intentional learning (INT) can be defined as 
learning which takes place when subjects are instructed to 
learn the material for which retention will be tested (Post­
man, 1964). McLaughlin (1965) maintains that differences 
between INT and INC are quantitative in nature rather than 
qualitative. Postman (1964) also stated that free recall 
following INT and INC is describable by the same set of 
principles. Although INC may be less efficient than INT, 
Berlyne (1960) is of the conviction that what can be called 
incidental learning makes up the majority of man's learning 
experience.
21
INC has been explored as a function of various experi­
mental and subject variables; McLaughlin's extensive review 
(1965) covers much of this literature. He cites research 
evidence that INC is a function of such experimental vari­
ables as practice, amount of material, exposure time, and 
serial position. The meaningfulness of the learning material 
has received a great deal of experimental attention. 
McLaughlin concluded: "The slope of the functions relating 
meaningfulness to recall is consistently steeper under INC 
than under INT conditions (p. 368)." That is. the lower the 
association value of the stimuli the greater the differences 
between INT and INC.
INC has also been explored as a function of individual 
differences. While Cohen and Nelson (1965) found no sig­
nificant sex differences in INC, both Cohen (1966) and Sp* '■ 
and James (1969) found that females show significantly more 
INC than do males. Cohen and Nelson were also led to the 
tentative conclusion that personality differences account for 
some of the differences they noted in INC. In a follow-up 
study, Cohen (1966) correlated INC and the personality traits 
measured by the Guilford-Martin Inventory of Factors. The 
obtained correlations were not very promising. More impres­
sive results were obtained in the research relating INC and
22
the variable field-dependence. Messick and Bamarin (1964) 
found that field-dependent subjects showed significantly bet­
ter incidental recall of photographs than did field-independ­
ent subjects. Using incidental presentation of words convey­
ing social implications, Fitzgibbons, Goldberger and Eagle 
(1965) found that field-dependent subjects showed greater 
recall than did field-independent subjects.
Using an INC paradigm, Seeman (1963) found that 
internally-oriented subjects showed greater retention than 
did externally-oriented subjects. He used a reformatory 
population where inmates rated information regarding the 
immediate reformatory situation, parole information, and 
long range opportunities as being interesting or not inter­
esting. Following this rating procedure, the subjects were 
tested for retention of the information. The results sup­
ported the conclusion that Internals are more likely to 
gather information from their environment than are Externals.
Spjut and James (1969) conducted a more direct study of 
the relationship between I-E and INC. In their study the 
major dependent variable was the number of incidentally 
learned items in a situation where university students were 
instructed to learn a list of words but received no instruc­
tions to learn the two-digit numbers which accompanied each
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■word.. The words were ten nouns randomly selected from the 
Thorndike-Lorge list which were of equal concreteness, 
imagery and meaningfulness as determined by Paivio, Yuille, 
and Madigan (1968) . They were paired .fith randomly selected 
two-digit numbers and projected onto a screen. At the end of 
each trial subjects were allowed time to free recall the 
words. The dependent variable for incidental learning was 
the number of correctly recalled numbers following the final 
recall period. The results supported the prediction that 
Internals would show greater incidental learning than would 
Externals.
Research exploring the relationship between INC and 
motivation has yielded a complex picture of the role that 
motivation plays. Motivation can be conceptualized as 
stemming from various sources such as monetary incentive, 
anxiety conceived as a drive state (as measured by the Taylor 
MAS), the intentional arousal of emotional responses via dif­
fering instructions, or cognitive dissonance. Apparently the 
type of results to be expected vary depending on which of the 
various theoretical conceptions of motivation the experiment­
er chooses to use (McLaughlin, 1965). For example, Paradow- 
ski (1967) argues that aversive stimulation serves to reduce 
INC due to a reduction in the range of cue utilization while
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an increase in the range cf cue utilization occurs with 
arousal conditions which are characterized by positive affect 
and interest. In an experiment using pictures of "common" and 
"novel" animals on different backgrounds with different col­
ored borders, he found that both INT and INC were signifi­
cantly increased for the novel material. He attributed the 
increase to curiosity arousal.
Weick (1964) suggested that individuals may reduce dis­
sonance by enhancing their task performance as well as by 
positively evaluating the task. Waterman and Katkin (1967) 
explored the dynamogenic effect of dissonance. They found 
that dissonance facilitated performance on both simple and 
complex digit symbol tasks. As compared to Weick*s sugges­
tion that dissonance arousal leads both to task enhancement 
and task reevaluation, Pallak, Brock and Kiesler (1967) and 
Pallak and Kiesler (1968) suggested that subjects may avoid 
dissonance rather than reduce it via reevaluation. Their 
experiments entailed giving subjects either high choice (high 
dissonance condition) or low choice (low dissonance con­
dition) to perform a dull paired-associate copying task. 
Although the subjects were not instructed to retain the 
paired-associates, a measure of retention was obtained at 
the end of the experiment. They, therefore, were using an
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INC paradigm. Their results confirmed their preduction that 
more paired-associates would be retained by the high-choice 
subjects than by the low-choice subjects. That is, subjects 
experiencing high cognitive dissonance showed greater INC 
than did subjects in the low dissonance condition.
PURPOSE
The purpose of the present study was to examine the 
relationships between cognitive dissonance, individual dif­
ferences, and INC. The individual difference variables were 
sex and I-E classification. The subjects were given either 
high-choice (high dissonance) or low choice (low dissonance) 
to continue to participate in a word-copying task conceptual­
ized as being dull and boring. Attitude and INC measures 
were obtained after the copying task was completed. The 
words employed varied in concreteness and serial position, 
permitting an analysis of these variables in relation to INC.
Several hypothesis were formulated on the basis of the 
literature and previous experimentation by the writer.
These are:
Hypothesis I: Internals will evaluate the task equal­
ly favorably under both choice conditions; Externals will 
evaluate the task more favorably in the high-choice
condition than in the low-choice condition.
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Hypothesis II: Internally-oriented subjects will show 
more INC than externally-oriented subjects.
Hypothesis III: Females will show more INC than males.
Hypothesis IV: A curvilinear relationship will be 
obtained between concreteness and recall, with the most 
abstract and the most concrete words recalled better than 
words of intermediate character.
Hypothesis V: A strong recency effect will appear in 




The subjects used in the present study were enrolled in 
the introductory psychology course at the University of North 
Takota. Each student enrolled in the course had taken the 
James I-E scale, called the DeKalb Student Opinion Survey- 
Form I-E, at the beginning of the semester. Subjects were 
selected on the basis of their I-E scores. Only subjects 
whose scores deviated approximately 1.0 standard deviation 
from the mean were used. Externals had scores of 48 or 
higher and Internals had scores of 32 or lower. Subjects 
were contacted by phone relative to participation in the 
study. Those who participated in the study received credit 
to fulfill the research requirement for the course. If they 
already had earned the required number of research credits 
they were allowed extra credit.
Material and Apparatus
Nouns used in the experiment were obtained from Paivio, 
Yuille and Madigan (1968) , who presented concreteness- 
abstractness values for 925 nouns. The values were obtained
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from subjects who rated each word on seven-point scales.
Four sets of 45 words each were made. The words were se­
lected to represent four different levels of concreteness. 
Levels are defined by the following ranges on the seven point 
scale: 1.18-2.20 (most abstract), 3.00-4.00, 5.00-600, 
6.76-7.00 (most concrete). Each set contained 24 words of 
AA or A frequency and 21 words of lower frequency.
The words were typed on onion skin paper from which 
slides were made. The order of presentation of the complete 
list of 180 words was randomized with the stipulation that 
each consecutive group of 12 words contain 3 words from each 
set. A Kodak Carousel 800 slide projector was used to pro­
ject the stimuli onto a screen. The projector was operated 
automatically so that a different slide was projected each 
5 sec. Total projection time was 15 minutes.
Design and Procedure
The present study was a 2 X 2 X 2 factorial design. The 
independent variables were choice-no choice, sex, and person­
ality (I-E) . Eighty subjects participated in the study in 
groups ranging in size from 8 to 17. Subjects were randomly 
assigned to either the choice or the nc-choice condition and 
the following instructions were read to them.
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This is part of an experiment dealing with developing 
ways of studying handwriting. It has been found that in 
order to analyze a person's handwriting completely, a fairly 
large sample of his handwriting is required. This sample 
should include many letter combinations and words, and yet 
this sample should be obtained in a controlled and scientific 
manner. This is why a projector which projects words auto­
matically and for a specified time period has been selected 
for this experiment. All that is required of you is that 
you copy the words as they are projected onto the screen into 
a little booklet provided for this purpose. There are ten 
lines per page and you should write just one word per line. 
Throughout the entire experiment try to write each word as 
naturally as possible. When you have filled any one page in 
the booklet, fold it back and continue on the next page. A 
very long list of words is being used in this experiment and 
some groups of students have described the task of copying 
the words as very monotonous due to the length of the word 
list. Others have thought the task of copying the words was 
dull and uninteresting. In spite of this do your best to 
write as naturally as possible.
Please do not talk at all during the entire experiment.
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After 10 slides had been presented the projector was stopped 
and, depending on the group, the following instructions were 
read.
Choice
You have fulfilled your research requirement by report­
ing for the experiment and participating this far. Further 
participation is not required in order for you to receive 
your research credit. You are under no further obligation 
to remain and you can leave now if you wish (pause). Some 
previous subjects have chosen to leave at this time and you 
have the same right to make that decision (pause). Do you 
want to continue? Are you sure?
No choice
In previous research with this same task some groups of 
subjects were given the choice to leave or to continue at 
this point. They could do so and still receive research 
credit for participating in the experiment. You will NOT be 
given that choice. In order for you to receive your research 
credit for participating in this experiment you are required 
to stay and complete it. I want to emphasize that you are 
obligated to continue at this time.
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Following the reading of the choice or no-choice in­
structions, the task continued for the no-choice group and 
for those in the choice group who chose to remain. Provision 
was made so that subjects from the choice group would fill 
out forms similar to those all other subjects filled out at 
the end of the copying task. After all subjects had completed 
the attitude questionnaire (see Fig. 1), administered at the 
end of the copying task, they were requested to write down 
all the words that they could remember. They were encouraged 
to guess. Following this, all subjects in the choice con­
dition were requested to write their reason(s) for staying 
when they were given the choice of leaving and still receiv­
ing research credit.
INSTRUCTION
To answer the questions, make a mark on the line at the point which represents your 
true feelings. The labelled points are provided to serve as a guide for your judgments. 
Your marks do not have to be at any one of the labelled points unless one of these 
points actually represents your feelings. Feel free to use any point of the line.
1. Considering that you volunteered for this experiment, how much choice did you feel 
that you had to complete the experiment or to leave without completing it?
complete choice very much choice some choice very little choice no choice
OJ2. Was the task involved in this experiment interesting or was it boring? M
extremely very somewhat neither interesting somewhat very extremely
boring boring boring nor boring interesting interesting interesting
3. How do you feel about having taken part in this experiment?
extremely moderately neither satisfied moderately extremely





Perceived choice means, standard deviations, and three- 
way analysis of variance are shown in Table I. It can be 
seen that the choice instructions were effective. Individ- 
als who were told that they had the choice to leave the 
experimental setting perceived a significantly greater free­
dom of choice than did those subjects who were told they had 
no choice to leave and had to remain in the experimental 
setting. While the individuals who were told they had the 
choice to leave did perceive this choice, it is remarkable 
that not one of them actually did leave. Subsequent to the 
gathering of all the dependent measures, the individuals in 
the choice condition were requested to give their reason(s) 
for staying when they had been given the choice to leave. 
Each subject gave at least one reason for staying. The rea­
sons given included curiosity and interest in the experi­
ment, a feeling that he had nothing else to do, a feeling 
he wasn't a quitter, a feeling that he had already expended 
effort to get to the experiment, and a feeling that he
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should work longer to deserve receiving his research credit. 
It is interesting to note that of the 24 responses including 
a reference to an interest or curiosity regarding the exper­
iment, internally-oriented Ss gave 16, while externally- 
oriented Ss gave only 8. Orly one subject made reference 
to a feeling of group pressure and a need to conform, and 
then only following a statement regarding his curiosity.
A second look at Table I indicates that both the I-E 
factor and the Sex X I-E interaction effect also reached 
significance. It can be seen that Internals perceived a 
greater degree of freedom than did Externals in both the 
choice and no-choice conditions. In addition, for both the 
choice and no-choice conditions and for all groups male 
Internals perceived the greatest freedom of choice, while 
male Externals perceived the lowest freedom of choice. The 
males provide the greatest variance on this variable. While 
the same directional difference holds for females, the 
differences are not nearly as great.
35
TABLE I
MEANS, STANDARD DEVIATIONS, AND ANALYSIS
OF VARIANCE OF PERCEIVED CHOICE
Choice
Male-I Male-E Female-I Female-E
Mean 63.50 44.70 60.10 58.90
S.D. 13.28 17.68 13.49 12.30
No Choice
Male-I Male-E Female-I Female-E
Mean 47.20 26.90 36.60 33.40
S.D. 23.87 18.90 21.19 22.89
Source Sum of Squares df Mean Squares F P
Choice 8632.0 1 8632.0 25.36 <.01
Sex 56.1 1 56.1 0.16 NS
I-E 2365.3 1 2365.3 6.95 <.01
Choice x Sex 277.5 1 277.5 0.81 NS
Choice x I-E 15.3 1 15.3 0.04 NS
Sex x I-E 1505.1 1 1505.1 4.42 <.05
C x S x I-E 0.3 1 0.3 0.01 NS




MEANS, STANDARD DEVIATIONS, AND ANALYSIS
OF VARIANCE OF INTEREST
Choice
Male-I Male-E Female-I Female-E
Mean 41.30 35.40 41.00 43.90
S.D. 11.31 15.67 8.26 15.35
No Choice
Male-I Male-E Female-I Female-E
Mean 38.60 38.90 43.60 40.80
S.D. 8.08 16.56 15.15 9.54
Source Sum of Squares df Mean Squares F P
Choice .1 1 .1 .01 NS
Sex 285.0 1 285.0 1.70 NS
I-E 37.8 1 37.8 .23 NS
Choice x Sex 2.1 1 2.1 .01 NS
Choice x I-E .3 1 .3 .01 NS
Sex x I-E 40.6 1 40.6 .24 NS
C x S x I-E 177.0 1 177.0 1.06 NS




MEANS, STANDARD DEVIATIONS, AND ANALYSIS
OF VARIANCE OF SATISFACTION
Choice
Male-I Male-E Female-I Female-E
Mea 1 45.60 47.50 44.60 49.00
S.D 8.95 12.86 8.64 10.01
No Choice
Male-I Male-E Female-I Female-E
Mean 42.30 42.70 50.20 47.50
S.Dt 13.06 8.76 12.04 9.24
Source Sum of Squares df Mean Squares F P
Choice 20.0 1 20.0 .18 NS
Sex 217.8 1 217.8 1.94 NS
I-E 20.0 1 20.0 .18 NS
Cho ice x Sex 186.1 1 186.1 1.66 NS
Che ice x I-E 92.4 1 92.4 .82 NS
Se: c I-E .4 1 .4 .01 NS
C x S x I-E 39.2 1 39.2 .35 NS




MEANS, STANDARD DEVIATIONS, AND ANALYSIS
OF VARIANCE OF TOTAL RECALL
Choice
Male-I Male-E Female-I Female-E
Mean 13.90 13.10 14.90 15.90
S.D 6.17 6.28 5.55 4.40
No Choice
Male-I Male-E Female-I Female-E
Mean 12.80 10.30 14.30 13.30
S.D. 7.83 5.36 7.52 6.36
Source Sura of Squares df Mean Squares F P
Choice 63.0 1 63.0 1.60 NS
Sex 86.1 1 86.1 2.18 NS
I-E 13.6 1 13.6 .34 NS
Choice x Sex .6 1 .6 .01 NS
Choice x I-E 17.1 1 17.1 .43 NS
Sex x I-E 13.6 1 13.6 .32 NS
C x S x I-E .2 1 .2 .01 NS





MEANS, STANDARD DEVIATIONS, AND ANALYSIS
OF VARIANCE OF RECALL BY CONCRETENESS
1 2
Male Female Male Female
Mean 3.65 4.62 2.85 2.75
S.D. 2.34 2.93 2.15 1.79
3 4
Male Female Male Female
Mean 2.52 2.62 3.45 4.50
S.D. 2.06 2.03 2.32 2.73
Source Sum of Squares df Mean Squares F P
Between subiects 799.00 79
Sex 20.50 1 20.50 2.05 NS
error 778.50 78 9.98
Within subiects 1071.75 240
Concreteness 152.96 3 50.99 13.31 <.01
Sex x Concreteness 20.96 3 6.99 1.82 NS
error 897.83 234 3.83
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TABLE VI
MEANS, STANDARD DEVIATIONS, AND ANALYSIS OF
VARIANCE OF RECALL BY SERIAL POSITION
1 2
Male Female Male Female
Mean 1.62 2.22 2.70 3.08
S.D. 1.59 1.93 1.83 1.76
3 4
Male Female Male Female
Mean 2.92 3.15 5.25 6.12
S.D. 2.14 2.30 2.90 2.89
Source Sum of Squares df Mean Squares F P
Between subiects 771.98 79
Sex 21.53 1 21.53 2 c 24 NS
error 750.45 78 9.62
Within subiects 1413.75 240
Serial Position 624.11 3 208.03 62.10 <.01
Sex x Serial Position 4.81 3 1.60 .48 NS
error 784.83 234 3.35
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Table II presents means , standard deviations, and 
three-way analysis of variance for degree of interest ex­
pressed in the task of copying the words. All mean scores 
on this scale are in the mid-range, in the neither interest­
ing nor boring range. None of the main effects or inter­
actions reached statistical significance. There was vir­
tually no difference between the choice and no-choice con­
ditions. Although females rated the task as being slightly 
more interesting than did the males, this difference is far 
from being statistically significant. The difference, 
associated with the I-E dimension was negligible.
Means, standard deviations, and three-way analysis of 
variance of satisfaction-dissatisfaction are presented in 
Table III. The mean ratings of satisfaction-dissatisfaction 
fall within a narrow range, in the neither satisfied nor 
dissatisfied part of the scale. There are negligible dif­
ferences associated with the choice, no-choice condition 
and the I-E dimension. Females tended to express greater 
satisfaction, but this difference is also far from being 




Table IV shows means, standard deviations, and three- 
way analysis of variance of the INC recall scores. The mean 
number of words recalled ranged from 12.80 to 15.90, or ap­
proximately 8 per ce .1: of the total number of words pre­
sented. From the analysis of variance it may be seen that 
none of the main effects or interaction effects reached sta­
tistical significance. While choice subjects and females 
recalled a greater number of words than did their counter­
parts, these differences were not statistically significant.
The INC data were also analyzed to determine if recall 
was a function of the variables concreteoess and serial po­
sition. Although none of the effects from the analysis of 
variance total recall achieved significance, the sex vari­
able showed the largest difference and was carried along in 
the subsequent analyses. Means, standard deviations, and 
the repeated measures analysis of variance for the variable 
abstractness-concreteness are presented in Table V. The con­
creteness effect reached statistical significance (p .01). 
The most abstract and most concrete words were more fre­
quently recalled than were the words from the middle of the 
range. The words which were of medium concreteness (sets 2 
and 3) were recalled nearly equally well, as were the most
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abstract (set 1) and most concrete (set 4) words.
Table VI presents the means, standard deviations, and 
analysis of variance for serial position. The serial posi­
tion effect was statistically significant and the pattern of 
means indicates this is a recency effect. Recall was 
highest for the words nearest the end of the list.
CHAPTER IV
DISCUSSION
The theory of cognitive dissonance claims that when an 
individual maintains "nonfitting" cognitions, a state of 
discomfort is aroused, resulting in behavior changes, cog­
nitive changes, or exposure to new information. In forced- 
compliance studies, the general finding has been that those 
who choose to engage in a dull and repetitious task with 
little justification subsequently evaluate the task more 
favorably than do those who were forced to engage in the 
activity. That is, dissonant subjects in this paradigm 
resort to cognitive changes. In the present study subjects 
were given the choice of continuing or ceasing the task of 
copying a long list of words which were presented singly. 
From dissonance theory it would be expected that choice sub­
jects would evaluate the tasks more favorably than would the 
no-choice subjects. This basic expectation was revised 
somewhat by both experimental findings and casual observa­
tions that individuals scoring in the internal direction on 
the internal-external locus of control personality dimension 
frequently respond differently in experimental settings than 
do those scoring in the external direction. Internals seem
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to find a greater element of interest in experimental tasks 
under almost all conditions. In this study, therefore, it 
was expected that while Externals were likely to engage in 
positive task reevaluation, Internals would evaluate the 
task equally favorably under both conditions. The data 
presented in Table II indicate that while no such reevalua­
tion occurred in Externals, Internals did evaluate the task 
equally favorably under both choice and no-choice condi­
tions. The basic hypothesis was, however, that an inter­
action effect would be obtained, so it cannot be said that 
Hypothesis I received experimental support. Not only was 
Hypothesis I not confirmed, but there was no overall dif­
ference between choice and no-choice conditions, a finding 
which is not consonant with other dissonance research.
This failure cannot be attributed to a failure of the choice 
instruction, since from Table I it can be seen that these 
instructions were effective. Neither can it be argued that 
dissonant subjects felt greater satisfaction in their per­
formance, since the data presented in Table III indicate no 
significant differences on this variable. From the data 
obtained it appears that if differential dissonance was 
aroused in this study, it was not differentially reduced
via the mechanism of task reevaluation.
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Pallak, Brock and Kiesler (1967) and Pallak and Kies- 
ler (1968) are convinced that subjects may avoid dissonance 
in the forced-compliance paradigm. They state that dis­
sonant subjects will evidence enhanced task performance 
rather than positive task reevaluation. Their data indicate 
that high dissonance subjects showed greater INC than did 
low dissonance subjects in an experimental situation where 
subjects copied paired associates. Their findings can 
be compared with those of the present study since both 
utilized an INC paradigm. In addition, the present study 
can be considered to be a partial replication of the Spjut 
and James (1968) study, which found that females and Inter­
nals showed greater incidental learning than did their 
respective counterparts. Hypotheses II and III present 
the predictions made in the present study. From Table IV 
it can be seen that these hypotheses were not supported.
That is, there were no statistically significant diffe*_nces 
in incidental learning as a function of sex, I-E, or choice. 
These results do not support the findings of others men­
tioned above. It would appear that despite the previous 
research, the effect of these variables on incidental learn­
ing has not been unequivocally resolved.
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This apparent failure to obtain differences in response 
measures which are usually sensitive to dissonance reduction 
is somewhat puzzling since the present study definitely has 
a certain degree of face validity. A reexamination of dis­
sonance theory statements relative to forced-compliance may 
help. A general statement regarding this paradigm is that 
subjects who choose to engage in a dull and repetitious task 
with little justification subsequently evaluate the task 
more favorably than do those who were forced to engage in 
the activity. There are three basic elements in the state­
ment: choice, dullness, and justification. While the data
indicate that a marked difference in freedom of choice was 
perceived in the present study, data relevant to the two 
additional elements are not so unequivocal.
All subjects participating in this experiment were con­
tacted by phone and informed that they would either receive 
regular research credit for their participation in the ex­
periment or extra credit if they had already earned the 
required amount of research credits. The personal contact, 
as well as the research credit arrangement, may have in­
creased subjects' perceived justification for participation 
in the experiment. In addition, the introductory instruc­
tions stated that their handwriting would be analyzed.
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Although it was not stated they would be informed of the 
analysis, several subjects later intimated they would like 
to receive such ar; analysis. That the instructions likely 
facilitated an alteration in perceived justification for 
participation may be inferred from the relatively large 
number of statements regarding curiosity and interest in 
the experiment, 24 in all, given by those subjects who did 
not leave when given that choice. The prospect of having 
their handwriting analyzed may have served as a potential 
justification for participation in the experiment. Although 
it seems reasonable to assume that a uniformly low level of 
perceived justification would be essential in a forced- 
compliance paradigm, Brock (1969) presented evidence which 
appears uo argue against this assumption. He varied both 
degree of volition and justification in an effort to deter­
mine the relative efficacy of these two elements in arousing 
dissonance. In the high-justification condition, subjects 
received eight relevant reasons, in the medium-justification 
condition they received three relevant reasons, and in the 
low-justification condition they were given eight factual 
statements regarding lung cancer. The relevant reasons 
generally appealed to the subject's dedication to science, 
the psychology department, the researcher, etc. Although
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there were nearly no differences in enjoyment scores across 
tie three levels of justification for subjects in m e  high 
or medium-volition conditions, degree of enjoyment decreased 
with increased justification for subjects in the low- 
vol'.tion condition. The difference between the high and 
medium trends, and the low-volition trend approached mar­
ginal reliability (p.<^.12). The groups which appear to be 
of particular relevance to the present study are those in 
the 1igh-justification condition, where the largest dif­
ferences in enjoyment were found between low-volition sub­
jects; and high and medium-volition subjects. It is felt 
that the present study was essentially a high-justification 
condition because of the previously discussed factors of 
perscnal contact, promise of research credit or extra 
credit, and the interest and curiosity aroused by the pros­
pect of having handwiting analyzed. From the above it would 
have; been expected that differences would have been obtained 
between the choice condition and the no-choice condition.
Why no such differences were obtained may be explicable in 
te::ms of the third essential element of the forced- 
c<mpliance paradigm; i.e., dullness of the task. First of 
all, it is remarkable that not one subject found the sample 
portion of the task dull enough to choose to leave when the
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opportunity was given, even though they clearly believed 
they had this option. In addition, the means presented in 
Table II indicate that none of the groups considered the 
task of copying the words to be extremely boring. Actually, 
all groups averaged in the neither interesting nor boring 
range of the attitude scale, as compared with the overall 
mean of enjoyment scores in the Brock study which was only 
somewhat greater than enjoyment to a very slight extent.
In retrospect, it appears that, in addition to possible dis­
sonance reduction via curiosity arousal, too much emphasis 
was placed on the "scientific" aspect of handwiring 
analysis, with the result that the tedious aspect of the 
copying task was too successfully masked. In other words, 
this task may not have fulfilled the paradigm's theoretical 
requirement that the task be aversive. While a low level 
of justification may not be essential in a forced- 
compliance paradigm, it appears that for differential 
dissonance to be aroused the task utilized should be uni­
formly evaluated as dull and boring. Since the task used 
in this study was not considered so aversive by those who 
participated, it is not so surprising that measures which 
are considered sensitive to differential dissonance reflect­
ed no such differences.
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Before moving on to further considerations of the re­
call data it should be pointed out from Table 1 that for 
both choice and no~choice conditions, and for all groups, 
male Internals perceived the greatest freedom of choice and 
male Externals perceived the lowest freedom of choice. Al­
though the same directional difference holds for females, 
the difference is not nearly as great. This finding sug­
gests that the I-E scale is successful in measuring a broad 
continuum of a personality construct for males, but may not 
be as successful for females.
Previous research (e.g., Dukes and Bastion, 1966) has 
indicated that free recall of words is a linear function of 
concreteness, with concrete words being recalled better than 
abstract words. Free recall as a function of concreteness 
has not been explored using an INC paradigm. Although 
extrapolation from INT studies would predict that recall 
of words in an INC paradigm should also show a linear 
relationship to concreteness, the pilot data collected 
for the present study indicated a curvilinear relationship. 
Accordingly, Hypothesis IV predicted a curvilinear relation­
ship with the expectation that the most abstract and the 
most concrete words would be recalled better than words of
intermediate concreteness. From Table V it can be seen that
<such a curvilinear relationship was replicated. Perhaps in 
a university setting where abstract reasoning ability is 
prized this finding is not surprising.
A strong recency effect generally occurs in free 
recall. The INC task in the present study is essentially 
a one-trial free recall task in which the presentation of 
words takes 15 minutes. Therefore, it was not surprising, 
as anticipated in Hypothesis V, that the most recently 




































































































































































































Subject 1 2 3 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 Recall
0 1 68 28 52 3 2 3 1 1 4 2 2 9
0 2 73 48 77 9 4 7 4 6 3 7 8 24
03 37 47 38 4 4 2 5 2 1 6 6 15
04 73 32 51 6 1 1 2 1 3 2 4 1 0
05 73 34 37 4 5 2 4 1 2 2 1 0 15
06 58 45 36 7 5 2 9 1 9 5 0 24
07 43 48 45 4 2 2 2 1 2 2 c 1 0
08 67 65 61 4 1 8 3 3 3 4 6 16
09 73 33 43 2 2 1 1 1 2 1 2 6
1 0 70 33 56 4 3 0 3 1 1 2 6 1 0
1 1 45 18 36 9 2 7 9 4 3 1 0 1 0 27
1 2 38 48 52 2 2 3 0 0 1 2 4 7
13 68 49 20 4 4 2 3 3 1 2 7 13
14 6 2 2 51 4 2 0 3 3 2 1 3 9
15 40 35 42 4 1 1 3 1 2 2 4 9
16 38 47 52 4 6 3 5 1 3 5 9 18
17 46 29 59 2 1 1 3 0 2 1 4 7
18 69 33 53 6 3 5 4 1 5 6 6 18
19 44 61 44 3 1 2 6 1 4 2 5 1 2



















CFI Subject 1 2 3
Concreteness 
1 2  3 4
Position
1 2  3 4 Recall.
2 1 69 48 37 2 0 7 3 3 3 3 3 1 2
2 2 67 35 59 0 o 2 1 0 1 5 2 7 15
23 31 47 50 1 1 4 1 3 1 6 6 6 19
24 68 45 44 7 2 4 3 3 3 6 4 16
25 55 47 37 4 2 1 2 1 3 1 4 9
26 73 33 53 8 4 4 7 3 6 6 8 23
27 57 47 54 3 4 4 6 3 4 7 4 18
28 44 25 38 1 0 4 3 3 0 6 8 7 2 1
29 68 35 36 1 2 1 6 2 3 2 3 1 0
30 69 48 38 /.*+ 0 0 2 1 1 0 4 6
CFE 31 52 2 1 52 3 2 1 4 0 1 1 8 1 0
32 71 48 36 7 3 2 13 4 5 6 1 0 25
33 73 19 56 1 5 3 5 1 2 2 9 14
34 69 60 52 8 3 3 3 4 3 2 8 17
35 44 47 52 9 1 5 4 1 3 5 1 0 19
36 68 49 53 6 1 6 4 3 5 3 6 17
37 44 34 37 5 2 1 9 4 2 4 7 17
38 69 48 65 5 0 0 6 0 3 4 4 1 1
39 55 49 34 5 3 3 6 0 3 1 1 0 17




1 2  3
Concreteness 
1 2  3 4
Position 
1 2  3 4 Recall
41 63 26 37 5 5 7 5 4 4 2 1 2 2 2
42 69 42 37 3 4 2 3 1 1 3 7 1 2
43 43 34 36 0 1 2 8 1 3 3 4 1 1
44 6 48 2 1 1 2 2 2 0 2 0 5 7
45 42 41 44 3 4 2 4 3 2 3 5 13
46 50 32 52 4 4 2 1 2 5 1 3 1 1
47 67 49 51 0 3 4 5 2 4 2 4 1 2
48 7 33 65 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 3
49 51 48 52 8 1 2 6 4 5 6 8 1 1 30
50 72 33 28 5 1 0 1 0 2 3 2 7
NCME 51 27 48 52 3 2 2 0 1 1 4 1 7
52 32 60 55 3 3 2 5 0 5 1 7 13
53 6 48 34 7 7 1 8 6 2 4 1 1 23
54 61 31 38 5 1 2 0 1 0 4 3 8
55 52 34 36 4 1 1 1 0 4 1 2 7
56 36 2 1 52 5 1 5 4 1 5 3 6 15
57 6 48 52 1 1 3 4 1 4 2 2 9
58 20 47 37 2 2 1 3 1 2 0 5 8
59 2 1 48 36 0 2 2 4 1 0 2 5 8
60 8 4 35 1 3 0 1 0 0 3 2 5
59
Attitudes 
NCFI Subject 1 2 3
Concreteness 
1 2  3 4
Position 
1 2  3 4 Recall
61 61 48 49 0 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 4
62 36 48 52 1 0 5 3 4 5 4 3 1 0 2 2
63 38 2 1 52 1 2 1 4 0 3 1 4 8
64 52 2 1 53 1 1 1 2 2 1 0 2 5
65 38 53 64 6 2 0 5 2 1 4 6 13
66 1 2 48 45 8 5 1 1 3 4 3 5 15
67 8 52 46 4 2 0 4 2 1 3 4 1 0
68 70 68 66 5 4 4 8 7 8 4 2 2 1
69 1 1 29 53 5 8 7 6 7 6 3 1 0 26
70 40 48 22 4 4 7 4 3 1 7 8 19
NCFE 71 63 29 46 9 3 2 1 1 4 8 2 15
72 37 48 38 3 3 2 7 2 2 2 9 15
73 1 2 44 43 2 5 2 6 1 1 2 4 15
74 6 48 51 2 1 2 0 0 1 0 4 5
75 46 26 37 2 2 4 2 0 2 3 5 1 0
76 38 27 48 3 2 1 4 3 4 0 3 1 0
77 14 42 37 4 4 5 3 5 2 3 6 16
78 68 48 52 4 1 4 3 1 2 2 7 1 2
79 6 48 64 7 6 6 9 6 3 6 13 28
80 44 48 59 2 0 1 4 0 2 0 5 7
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